

14 November 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director/Intelligence
ATTENTION : Assistant to DD/I (Plans)
SUBJECT : Draft O/NE Annex to DD/I War Plan

1. Attached is our proposed draft annex as requested in your memo of 1 July. I also have the following general comments.
2. AD/BI agrees with us that, while each of us produces a form of "national" intelligence, our problems are actually quite dissimilar. Therefore we each propose to submit separate annexes.
3. We also believe paragraph 2b (1) of the draft DD/I plan needs clarification. How long is this "initial phase" supposed to last? Does the strategic concept for this phase mean that only "evaluations of the current situation" will be required? Are these to be exclusively current intelligence in nature or do they include NIE-type evaluations? In almost any type of initial wartime situation we foresee an immediate need for coordinated estimates and believe that the strategic concept should so indicate. Any initial wartime disruption will not affect our capabilities any more than those of the current intelligence people.
4. O/NE depends heavily upon the other IAC agencies in preparation of NIE's. O/NE would oppose any proposed wartime

expansion of the role of other DD/I offices which may be at the expense of or conflict with the roles of the IAC agencies. In a situation where many offices or agencies may be bidding for a limited number of competent, experienced people, certain CIA expansion plans may be at the expense of the other IAC agencies. If CIA is to assume or duplicate some of the roles of these agencies in wartime it will affect the sources of O/NE support.

5. Assuming Washington is not attacked immediately upon outbreak of war, it will still be under threat of attack for an indeterminate period. Therefore, should not consideration be given to immediate establishment of cadres at the relocation center upon D-day, instead of waiting until an evacuation signal is given? If this concept were accepted, it would require some alteration in DD/I plans.

6. Finally, should there not be some general planning assumptions as to possible casualties in the opening round, so that we can make some advance plans on how we would operate with, say, two-thirds losses, almost total losses, etc.? We realize any such assumptions would have to be highly arbitrary but they would provide valuable planning ideas.

SHERMAN KENT
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National Estimates

ANNEX A
Wartime Production of National
Intelligence Estimates

REF: Draft Global War Plan for the DD/I Area

I. ASSUMPTIONS (in addition to those in DD/I War Plan)

A. That the NSC's wartime role as an over-all strategic planning body will require broad national intelligence support, including integration of military as well as political, economic, scientific, and other factors.

B. That this national intelligence will continue to be produced in the form of NIE's prepared by the IAC mechanism, with modifications to meet the wartime situation as appropriate. Such NIE's will continue to cover such broad aspects of enemy military capabilities as nuclear energy, guided missiles, air defense, etc., (if these are no longer to be handled via NIE's, an important alteration in O/NE functions is involved).

C. That intelligence estimates will be required for post-war planning.

II. WARTIME MISSION OF O/NE

O/NE will:

A. Perform essentially its present role in the production of coordinated national intelligence estimates to meet high policy needs.

B. Contribute to the DCI's briefing of the President and NSC, and to any White House Situation Room.

C. Provide the DCI with special non-coordinated estimates or memoranda on key estimative problems as desired.

D. Provide broad intelligence support on non-military aspects of JCS strategic planning as required.

E. Provide estimates in support of the CIA representatives on the NSC and OCB.

III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

1. To carry out the above mission, the following modifications in O/NE's peacetime operations are anticipated: (a) fewer broad country studies will be required; (b) there will be a greater number of special and "crash" estimates covering specific wartime problems; (c) the speed with which NIE's are produced will probably have to be stepped up, and geared to rapidly meeting a large number of less comprehensive requirements; (d) it may be desirable to produce a periodic monthly or perhaps biweekly global intelligence review which broadly outlines the global picture and makes general short-term projections; and (e) it may be desirable to provide support as background for any post-hostilities planning.

2. Though it is assumed some form of IAC coordinating mechanism for NIE's will exist in wartime, it may be impossible for the present system to continue in full operation. Therefore, streamlining of this mechanism may be essential, through such means as: (a) stationing IAC agency liaison officers with the Board, with certain powers to act for their principals; (b) coordinating in large measure by cable, secure teletype or secure phone; and (c) producing much briefer estimates, which could more easily be transmitted by cable, etc.

IV. PHASING OF OPERATIONS

A. Preparatory: pre D-day.

- (1) Prepare detailed wartime plans for implementation of O/NE over-all plan, including necessary draft directives.
- (2) Earmark, alert and pre-process (including security clearance) graduate and civilian reserve personnel (see Tab "A").
- (3) Develop systematic procedures for conversion to wartime operation; indoctrinate and train O/NE personnel for their wartime functions and for operation under wartime conditions.
- (4) Coordinate with other IAC agencies on joint planning for wartime operation of IAC estimates mechanism.

B. Initial Wartime Operation

- (1) Execute evacuation and redeployment plans if necessary.

But even if necessary to operate at greatly reduced scale, be prepared to meet urgent requirements for national estimates or such "current evaluations," as may be primarily estimative in nature.

- a. If headquarters is critically disrupted, small cadre should operate at relocation center.
- b. If operations can continue at headquarters larger scale operations should begin immediately.
- (2) Support operations of any Situation Room as required.
- (3) Alert civilian and graduate reservists for subsequent call.
- (4) Recall personnel assigned abroad as appropriate.

C. Post D-day Buildup

- (1) Gradually step up operations to meet wartime requirements.
- (2) Recall those reserve personnel not previously recalled.
- (3) Set up small post-hostilities intelligence group.

V. PERSONNEL STRUCTURE

A. Concept of Personnel Requirements. Assuming a somewhat higher load of estimates in wartime and a greater requirement for urgency in estimates production, some modest increase in personnel is desirable.

(1) The office should remain essentially civilian in composition, since the service agencies are already more than adequately represented in the IAC structure and O/NE's role is more civilian than military in nature. An essentially civilian O/NE can better act as an impartial coordinator and serve as a necessary bridge between the services and the State Department (See Tab "B").

(2) However, in a wartime situation many estimates will have a larger military content than formerly. Therefore O/NE should have on its staff a small number of competent military analysts (2-3 on the Bloc and 1 per other section) to facilitate our own review of military aspects of NIE's. These should not be drawn (except in exceptional cases) from CIA reservists who have only limited military background, but rather should be assigned by the IAC agencies and be competent professional officers.

(3) No increase in the Board's size seems necessary but it might be advisable to give it a larger military contingent. Some increase in the staff is desirable to meet probable wartime requirements (See Tab "C").

(4) In addition, in view of the fact that liaison with the IAC agencies may prove difficult in wartime, O/NE should probably be authorized to draw staff assistance more fully from O/CI, O/RR and O/SI.

(5) O/NE (or DD/I) liaison officers should be assigned to CIA components at major theater headquarters to funnel back pertinent material and ensure adequate dissemination of the Washington product.

B. Pre-D-day Structure. Peacetime structure would not be altered. Reserve personnel would be informed of contemplated wartime assignment.

C. Initial Wartime Structure. During this initial period O/NE will probably have to operate with essentially its peacetime complement, or even on a reduced scale in event of attack damage. However, reservists can be alerted and final plans for wartime operations made.

D. Post D-day Buildup. Personnel structure will be expanded and reservists fitted in. Liaison officers will be detailed abroad as appropriate.

VI. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

A. O/NE will require no additional space during the pre-D-day or initial wartime periods. If a post D-day buildup is authorized a modest amount of extra office space and equipment would be required.